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ABSTRACT 
From his first attempts to explain attachment phenomena in the 1940s through his 
Attachment and Loss trilogy (trilogy; 1969|1982, 1973, 1980), John Bowlby reformulated the 
theoretical underpinnings of attachment theory several times. He initially attempted to 
explain attachment phenomena in psychoanalytic terms. Then he invoked ethological theory 
in the explanation of how and why people behave as they do in close personal relationships. 
The mature theoretical framework that he presented between 1969 and 1982 in the 
attachment and loss trilogy retained strengths and insights, ultimately situating them within 
an overarching control systems framework. This paper describes key stages in Bowlby’s 
theoretical development, with particular emphasis placed on the emergence of control 
systems theory as a cornerstone of the mature theory.  It also compares Bowlby’s control 
systems approach to contemporary cognitive science approaches. It concludes by suggesting 
how Bowlby’s control systems formulation could evolve along the path opened up by 
contemporary work in computational modeling and how it could benefit by doing so.  
Keywords: attachment theory; Computational Modeling; Cognitive Science; Attachment 
control system; Internal Working Model; Cognitive architecture  
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THE ATTACHMENT CONTROL SYSTEM AND COMPUTATIONAL MODELING 
This paper is an analysis of how John Bowlby developed the ‘attachment control 
system’ concept. Bowlby’s use of the concept originated as an attempt to explain a complex 
cluster of behavioral and psychological phenomena related to attachment relationships, 
without invoking explanations in terms of psychoanalytic constructs. Bowlby’s approach 
assimilated an armory of modeling techniques from cybernetics, artificial intelligence and 
other scientific approaches to explaining these phenomena. In doing so, he employed both 
emerging cognitive theories and introduced concepts and explanations which were ahead of 
his time. Indeed, many of his explanations have a very contemporary cognitive science 
‘feel’ (Petters, 2016). However, he faced one critical obstacle in presenting cognitive 
science complexity as a substitute for psychoanalytic complexity - namely, that cognitive 
science was in its infancy. At the time, few models spoke directly to the kinds of 
psychoanalytic processes he wanted to re-describe in cognitive terms.  
Bowlby described his foray from psychoanalytic theory into ethology, and then into a 
variety of research areas concerned with human information processing, as an attempt to 
provide a scientifically respectable foundation for attachment theory (Bowlby 1981). A 
conceptual analysis of the development of attachment theory provides useful insights into 
Bowlby’s strategy, and into the convergence of his ideas with the undertaking we recognize 
today as cognitive science.   
Bowlby (1969, p. 43) viewed his control systems framework as an initial explanatory 
model to be extended and deepened, and ultimately integrated with scientific explanations at 
other levels of abstraction.  Recent neuroimaging results presented by Bretherton and 
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Munholland (2016) support this approach. However, since the information processing 
models with which Bowlby illustrates his attachment explanations are relatively simple, it 
can seem that he was presenting these ideas as a metaphor that could be invoked to 
differentiate attachment theory from psychoanalysis, and then be safely ignored (Bretherton 
1985, p. 12-13; Bretherton 1999, p. 1; Bretherton and Munholland 2016, p. 63 and p. 68; 
Hinde 1991, p. 378 and 397).   A key contribution of this paper is to show that the control 
system concepts Bowlby employed can be more than mere metaphors.  Using contemporary 
cognitive science modeling, it is now possible to implement the kind of empirically 
accessible, information based attachment theory that Bowlby anticipated but found just 
beyond his reach.  
STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ATTACHMENT THEORY  
Bowlby was spurred to develop attachment theory by observing the effects separation 
and loss on human relationships. His data included observations of  childhood evacuations 
during war-time  (Bowlby, 1940a), the prohibition of parental hospital visits to their young 
children (Bowlby, 1940b), the effect of early maternal deprivation on later development 
(Bowlby, 1944), and the behavioral phases of grief and mourning observed in the course of 
long term separations during infancy (Bowlby, 1960a).  
Uncomfortable with psychoanalysts use of retrospection and inference, Bowlby’s initial 
thinking leaned heavily on such observation and description (e.g., Bowlby, J. 1951; Bowlby & 
Robertson, 1952); theoretical development and innovation were secondary. In addition, the 
target for theoretical explanation was initially broader and then focussing strategically on 
the mother-infant relationship. During attachment theory’s long theoretical development, 
Bowlby imported ideas from diverse disciplines to explain phenomena related to social and 
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emotional attachments in close relationships (Ainsworth & Bowlby, 1991; Bowlby, 1969 / 
1982; Bretherton, 1992; Holmes, 1993). He adopted new concepts to substitute for 
psychoanalytic constructs which he wanted to transform. Surveying the range of concepts 
Bowlby introduced over time, we can see he was influenced by dramatic changes in the 
intellectual milieu between 1950 and 1980. Explanatory concepts which were newly 
prominent had a particularly strong influence as Bowlby formulated elements of attachment 
theory at those times. The development of attachment theory during this period falls into 
three phases: (1) Bowlby’s initial thinking in the late 1940s and early 1950s had a heavy 
psychoanalytic influence (Bowlby, 1956); (2) introducing concepts from ethology (Bowlby, 
1958, 1960d); and (3) from cybernetics and artificial intelligence (Bowlby, 1969, 1973) and 
ultimately integrating with cognitive psychology (Bowlby, 1980).   
Before Attachment theory: A Psychoanalytic Theory  
Bowlby became interested in personality development and the key role played by an 
individual’s early caregiving environment before he trained as a psychoanalyst ((Ainsworth 
& Bowlby, 1991), p 333). His belief in the significance of real life events on the course of 
child development set him in conflict with several psychoanalysts with whom he worked at 
the Tavistock Clinic in the late 1940s, resulting in his forming his own research unit in 1948 
(Bretherton, 1992). At an early stage of his research career he chose to focus on the effects 
of early separation from the mother rather than other examples of disturbed family 
interaction. Bowlby made this decision due to practical considerations, as he intended to 
work within a scientific methodology which focused on analyzing the effect of 
environmental conditions. This was in contrast to adopting the retrospective case study 
conducted by other psychoanalysts. From Bowlby’s view, separation events were 
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particularly suitable for research as they were an event on record, whereas at that time there 
was no adequate reporting or documentation for other forms of disturbed family interaction 
(Ainsworth & Bowlby, 1991, p. 334).  
Bowlby’s departure from the mainstream of psychoanalysis was also due to his 
awareness of problems with Freud’s motivational theory. For Bowlby, this approach to 
motivation required revision because it was rooted in a drive theory which suggested infants 
were primarily focused on their inner drives and drive representations, and little interested 
in the social or physical environment per se (Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada, & Richters, 
1991). This focus inwards was in part driven by the psychoanalytic retrospective case study 
method which Bowlby had rejected (van der Horst, 2011). Critiques from psychology and 
philosophy of science also made clear that the drive theory of motivation was not tenable. It 
was not well supported by their own evidence, which itself was problematic, and seemed 
inaccessible to ordinary standards of empirical analysis and falsification (Bowlby, 1981). 
In 1951 Bowlby published a landmark report to the World Health Organization which 
contained a substantial body of observations on the mental health of children (Bowlby, 
1951). Although this report was principally a survey of empirical work, it also illustrates the 
manner in which Bowlby was attempting to reshape psychoanalytic theory. Bretherton 
(Bretherton, 1992) notes that: “it is interesting to examine the 1951 report from today’s 
perspective. At that time Bowlby still used the terminology of traditional psychoanalysis 
(love object, libidinal ties, ego, and superego), but his ideas were little short of heretical.” 
(Bretherton, 1992, p. 50)  
Bowlby’s unorthodoxy is highlighted by Bretherton ((Bretherton, 1992), p. 51):  
“[The mother] is his ego and his superego. Gradually he learns these arts himself, 
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and as he does, the skilled parent transfers the roles to him. This is a slow, subtle and 
continuous process, beginning when he first learns to walk and feed himself, and not 
ending completely until maturity is reached” ((Bowlby, 1951, p. 53, quoted in 
(Bretherton, 1992, p. 51).  
According to Bretherton, this description: “sounds more Vygotskian than Freudian”, 
((Bretherton, 1992), p. 51). Why did Bowlby attempt a transformation of psychoanalytic 
terms like ego and superego rather than just rejecting all of the psychoanalytic framework 
outright? Psychoanalysis did possess a number of key insights into early experiences and 
relationships which Bowlby valued and wanted to maintain in his own approach (Waters 
et al., 1991). These insights include that: human infants have a complex cognitive and 
emotional life; attachment cannot be equated with the amount of overt behaviour 
toward attachment figures or with the amount or duration of protest that follows 
separation; and early attachment relationships are prototypes of later love 
relationships (Waters et al., 1991). He therefore wanted to reform psychoanalytic theory 
not replace it wholesale. However, Bowlby, keenly aware of the sociology of science, 
recognized that critics would likely throw out the genuine insights along with the 
untenable motivation theory. He also recognized that the useful insights about early 
experience and relationships were logically independent of the drive theory. Central then 
to his work on attachment theory at this stage was to find an alternative approach to 
motivation. The key here was to avoid replacing one kind of magic (drives) with another 
(e.g., the infant intends, signals, wants, needs, loves, etc. the mother) thereby incurring 
what Dennett (1981) calls “intelligence loans”, presumptions of intelligence that are 
unlikely to be accounted for (“paid back”) (Richardson, Shockley, Fajen, Riley, & 
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Turvey, 2010). As we shall see, first in ethology, and later in cybernetics and artificial 
intelligence, Bowlby found approaches that could account for what he called ‘the 
apparently purposeful’ organization of observable attachment behavior without incurring 
such intelligence debts.  
As Ainsworth and Bowlby (Ainsworth & Bowlby, 1991) recount, it was in the 
early1950s that:  
“Bowlby [...] had begun a search for adequate explanation of the empirical findings, 
having found none in current psychoanalytic theories to account for young children’s 
responses to separation and reunion, or indeed how the tie to the mother develops. At this 
point Konrad Lorenz’s work on imprinting became available in translation. Sensing its 
possible relevance to his problem and encouraged by Julian Huxley, Bowlby began 
delving into the ethological literature.” (Ainsworth & Bowlby, 1991, p. 337)  
Though the first scientific approach that Bowlby drew upon was ethology, Bowlby’s 
revision of psychoanalytic theory with an ethological perspective occurred gradually. The 
transitional nature of Bowlby’s theoretical perspective at this time is illustrated by Bowlby 
himself in 1953, when he stated:  
“I want to remark on three or four psychological processes which may be relevant, 
and in doing so I shall speak in a hybrid, bastard language which I have come to use, 
which derives from both psychoanalysis and ethology” (Bowlby, 1956, p. 183-184).  
This shows Bowlby did not experience an overnight conversion from a psychoanalytic 
view to the scientific view provided by the then nascent disciplines of cybernetics, artificial 
intelligence and systems theory. However, we can see from the meetings he attended and 
the interactions he engaged in at these meetings that he was inexorably moved towards 
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viewing attachment relations in scientifically respectable information processing terms. For 
example, the transcript of the second meeting of the ‘World Health Organization Study 
Group on the Psychobiological Development of the Child’, in 1954, records Bowlby and 
Grey Walter discussing the scientific nature of the psychoanalytic superego’ construct:  
BOWLBY: The superego is rather complicated and contains more than one variable 
GREY WALTER: Can you measure the superego? 
BOWLBY: You cannot. 
GREY WALTER: Then what is the point of discussing it? 
BOWLBY: I think it is useful to try and see how things relate in these psychological 
functions after which we are dimly trying to grope. 
(Grey Walter, 1956, p. 205).  
To conclude, what Bowlby was trying to achieve by his departure from psychoanalysis 
was to explain attachment phenomena in a scientifically respectable manner without a 
wholesale rejection of the psychoanalytic perspective (Bowlby 1981). We might say that the 
psychoanalytic perspective acted as a kind of lens, because of the way Bowlby viewed 
phenomena through the filter and focus of his existing understanding, and a specification of 
requirements because a new scientifically respectable theory had a set of phenomena 
(important to psychoanalytic theory) which it must explain. In particular he wanted to 
explain aspects of the mother-infant relationship which were highlighted by the 
psychoanalytic approach. However, this was tricky because the kinds of psychological 
phenomena focused upon by psychoanalytic theorists are intimately related to the 
storehouse of theoretical mental structures and mechanisms invoked within this community.  
Attachment theory Proper: An Evolutionary Ethological Formulation  
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After Robert Hinde (a leading ethologist) joined the seminar group Bowlby established 
at the Tavistock clinic in 1954, the incorporation of ethological theory in Bowlby’s 
conceptual development deepened. This collaboration helped contribute to Bowlby’s first 
formal statement of attachment theory in his 1958 paper: ‘The Nature of the Child’s Tie to 
his Mother’ (Bowlby, 1958). This initial formulation was built upon three key postulates (1) 
attachment behaviors are species-specific behavior patterns which he termed ‘instinctual 
responses’; (2) the infant’s attachment is mediated by a set of simple behaviors which are 
part of our primate evolutionary endowment, and (3) with experience these behaviors 
become integrated into a more complex behavioral system with the predictable outcome of 
establishing and maintaining proximity to the mother. ((Bowlby, 1958, p. 366). It is worth 
emphasizing that, although later theories provided more detail on how the attachment 
system develops, even this early theory presents attachment responses as constructed 
through interaction between infants and their caregiving environment. This was an 
important point because, for many, invoking evolution suggested that the attachment system 
was like a preformed blueprint waiting to be triggered or maturing without experience. This 
was not Bowlby’s view at all. 
Between 1958, and the 1969 publication of the first volume of the Attachment and Loss 
Trilogy, Bowlby published six papers that reflect significant advances in his thinking 
(Bowlby, 1960a, 1960b, 1960c, 1960d, 1961a, 1963). From these ethological/evolutionary 
insights, Bowlby crafted alternative explanations for several key psychoanalytic 
formulations. Bowlby showed how ideas from ethology could be used to explain the 
ontogeny of object relations and anxious, depressed and defensive responses which are 
triggered by infant-mother separations (Bowlby 1960d). He considers the ethology inspired 
 ATTACHMENT AND MODELING                                                                                      12 
© 2018, American Psychological Association. This paper is not the copy of record and may not 
exactly replicate the final, authoritative version of the article. Please do not copy or cite without 
authors' permission. The final article will be available, upon publication, via its DOI: 
10.1037/dev0000647 
idea that attachment is a primary need which leads to the emergence of reciprocal social 
relationships during ontogeny. This theoretical innovation leads to the understanding that 
distress and anxiety are normal expectations when separations occur. While he still refers to 
many psychoanalytic constructs like ‘orality’, ‘repression’ and ‘symbolic substitutions’ he 
does speculate whether behavior previously thought to arise from these mechanisms might 
be better described by ethological concepts. For example, where psychoanalysts would 
explain one activity taking the place of another because of symbolic equivalence, Bowlby 
describes how this may occur at an intrasymbolic level due to ethological displacement 
activities. Two papers give an overview of behavioral phases related to attachment and loss, 
linking separation anxiety to protest; grief and mourning to despair and depression; and 
detachment to defensive processes (Bowlby, 1960c, 1961a). He makes the claim that these 
three types of response are phases of a single process, and each phase is best understood as 
part of the whole process. Bowlby claims that this insight was long to come to 
psychoanalysts such as Freud because they started with repression and ‘worked backwards’, 
rather than starting with loss and despair and then considering what might follow (Bowlby, 
1960c).  Bowlby also discussed links between models of motivation and mourning in 
infancy and adulthood (Bowlby, 1960a, 1960b, 1963). He was also clear in setting out the 
limitations of energy models of motivation. In arguing that an ethological framework is an 
improvement on psychoanalytic ideas he provided a great deal of detail on similarities 
between mourning in humans and in other animals. He went much further than the 1958 
paper in providing details of ethological mechanisms like the environmental triggers that 
activate behavior. He also reflects more deeply on theoretical foundations for this 
ethological model of attachment, with greater consideration of evolutionary functions 
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related to phenomena such as the subjective painfulness of mourning, and why grief often 
involves anger and hatred.  
Taken together these papers demonstrate Bowlby was creative in re-describing 
phenomena in ethological terms which had previously only been explained in 
psychoanalytic terms. It is noticeable how far he attempts to go with ethology as a substitute 
framework for psychoanalysis, in the depth and breadth of the phenomena he attempts to re-
explain. In these six papers Bowlby is presenting, in a scientific manner, the whole 
individual person, in his or her environment, and presenting them as possessing an 
ethological motivational system arrived at from an ontogenetic and evolutionary trajectory. 
However, no complex internal dynamics are presented in the approach set out in these six 
papers. When Bowlby does speculate on details of an internal architecture he either sticks 
with the simplicity of the ethological approach to architectural concerns, or he reverts back 
to a selective adaptation of Freudian ideas. Therefore, if Bowlby had stopped the 
development of attachment theory at the ethological stage the resulting framework would 
have lacked the complexity needed to explain the broad collection of cognitive and affective 
lifespan phenomena explained by the full control systems approach set out in his 
‘Attachment and Loss’ trilogy (Bowlby, 1969, 1969 / 1982, 1973, 1980). In summary, the 
ethological version of attachment theory was in several respects only part-way towards 
Bowlby’s final characterization of Attachment theory.  
The ‘Full-Strength’ Control System Formulation  
Bowlby’s final version of attachment theory, which was set-out across all three volumes 
of Bowlby’s Attachment Trilogy (Bowlby, 1969, 1969 / 1982, 1973, 1980), involves a 
richer and deeper conceptualization for attachment phenomena. Within a control system 
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framework, Bowlby’s three volume trilogy included information processing concepts such 
as homeostasis, hierarchical plans, internal working models, selective attention, and meta-
cognition. These concepts provide a coherent, integrated model for explanations of a range 
of attachment phenomena. Van der Horst (2011) described Bowlby’s adoption of an 
ethological framework as an “Archimedean moment” (van der Horst, 2011, p. 3). However, 
the adoption of a cybernetic and control systems framework in the late 1960s has as much 
claim to be a core pivotal moment as the earlier adoption of ethology in the late 1950s.  
Continuity and change in theoretical developments 
Bowlby reflected on the changing nature in his own theoretical approach during the 
1960s, when he described the difference between his 1958 version of his theory and the 
version in the 1969 first volume of the Attachment and Loss Trilogy:  
“The hypothesis proposed represents a development of that advanced by me in 1958. 
The principal change is due to better understanding of control theory and to recognition 
of the very sophisticated forms that behavioural systems controlling instinctive behaviour 
may take. In the present version of the hypothesis it is postulated that, at some stage in 
the development of the behavioural system responsible for attachment, proximity to 
mother becomes a set-goal. In the earlier version of the theory five patterns of behaviour 
- sucking, clinging, following, crying, and smiling - were described as contributing to 
attachment. 
In the new version these same five patterns are still held to be of great importance, 
but it is postulated that between the ages of about nine and eighteen months they usually 
become incorporated into far more sophisticated goal-corrected systems. These systems 
are so organised and activated that a child tends to be maintained in proximity to his 
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mother. [...] The earlier version of the theory was described as a theory of component 
instinctual responses. The new version can be described as a control theory of 
attachment behavior” ((Bowlby, 1969 / 1982, p. 180).  
Bowlby’s 1969 version of attachment theory shows the continued importance of secure 
base behavior with an increasing role for mental representation. As a control theory, the 
newer framework provides a greater focus on the attachment system as directed towards 
outcomes as set-goals to be achieved from a flexible behavioral repertoire rather than a 
system that simply involves triggering preset responses. However, the new theory still 
includes a strong ethological influence. Although the control systems formulation was a 
major departure from Bowlby’s early instinct theory, he retained his commitment to 
behavioral biology. For example, Bowlby still presents the attachment system as an instinct 
to form bonds and as a system that is activated by species specific patterns of care. In 
addition, Bowlby’s new terminology of behavior systems only masks a core theoretical 
inheritance from his ethological instinct theory. As Hinde notes:  
“The concept of a behavioural system is, in fact related to one meaning of the term 
instinct. [...] It has been used in a rather special sense by ethologists to refer to systems 
postulated as controlling a group of behaviour patterns that together serve to achieve a 
given biological end” ((Hinde, 1983, p. 57).  
Even while Bowlby was providing an alternative to psychoanalytic explanations for 
attachment behavior, the range and type of phenomena of interest to psychoanalysts 
provided much of his research agenda:  
“The resulting conceptual framework is designed to accommodate all those 
phenomena to which Freud called attention for example, love relations, separation, 
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anxiety, mourning, defense, anger, guilt, depression, trauma, emotional detachment, 
sensitive periods in early life and so to offer an alternative of the traditional 
metapsychology of psychoanalysis” ((Bowlby, 1969 / 1982), p. 668).  
Although Bowlby claimed that the trilogy sets out an approach which had already been 
fully conceived of at its initiation (Waters, personal communication), there were some 
limited changes in emphasis between the 1969 and 1980 publications. For example, the 
1969 volume incorporated Cybernetic and AI concepts and the 1973 and 1980 volumes 
show a switch in emphasis to Cognitive Psychology. This change is not surprising. Bowlby 
noted that both his, and Freud’s previous formulations of instinctive behavior, were both “a 
reflection of the scientific climate of the times” ((Bowlby, 1969 / 1982, p. 18). Clearly, to 
incorporate up-to-date citations in the three volumes of his trilogy as he published them 
would involve inclusion of some influences from contemporary theoretical sources. 
However, how far Bowlby was influenced merely by the nature of the ideas in current 
circulation at any given time should not be over emphasized. During the 30 years in which 
he constructed attachment theory he selected particularly suitable concepts which matched 
his current requirements. So, he did incorporate concepts from the current literature, but 
from a wide set of candidate ideas he selected those which possessed the appropriate 
properties and fitted within his existing framework. For example, in both the first and third 
volumes of the attachment trilogy psychoanalytic defensive processes are reframed in terms 
of how sensory inputs are processed. However, in the first volume this process is framed 
and referenced in terms of neurophysiological processes, in particular drawing upon the 
work of Magda Arnold (Bowlby, 1969 / 1982, p. 103), whereas in the third volume the 
same attachment phenomena are described in the newly fashionable cognitive psychological 
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terms of selective attention (Bowlby, 1980, chapter 4).  
THE ARCHITECTURE OF BOWLBY’S ATTACHMENT CONTROL SYSTEM 
In the first volume of his Attachment trilogy, Bowlby was continuing his search to 
consolidate the conceptual foundation for attachment theory by replacing Freud’s concept of 
psychical energy and its discharge (Bowlby, 1969 / 1982, p. 18). He introduced the 
attachment control system concept for this purpose. Bowlby presented ethological 
mechanisms operating within the attachment control system architecture as carrying out an 
action selection role. According to Bowlby, what defines the attachment control system is 
not a set behavior repertoire but the outcomes that predictably follow from these behaviors. 
Similar behaviors may be produced by different behavior systems. In both the 1958 and 
later versions of attachment theory, the behaviors related to attachment were organized 
according to four behavior systems, the attachment, fear, sociability and exploration 
systems. Where in the 1958 theory attachment instincts were linked to the activation of 
particular behaviors (which can be viewed as having an implicit goal in the sense of having 
a predictable outcome in environments similar to the species environment of evolutionary 
adaptedness), in the later final theory they were linked to the achievement of particular 
goals which are explicitly held as representations and which can be achieved by a variety of 
actions. 
To illustrate the internal organization of the attachment control system, Bowlby set out a 
range of control systems of increasing sophistication. For a simple example of a control 
system, which acted as a regulator by keeping a single variable constant, Bowlby presented 
the humble thermostat. He noted that this system was relatively static (with a pre-set goal) 
and unable to act as a model of even the simplest form of instinctive behavior. However, he 
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((Bowlby, 1969 / 1982), p. 44) showed how this control system design might be elaborated 
by allowing its goal setting to be determined by another control system. Such as servo 
mechanisms operating in a hierarchy.  He also sketches out further extensions to this simple 
design of a greater sheer scale and complexity. In Bowlby’s thinking the importance of the 
intimate integration of different representational forms is demonstrated when he noted:  
“The mental apparatus can be thought of as made up of a very large number of 
complex control systems, organized in a loosely hierarchical way and with an enormous 
network of two-way communications between them. At the top we postulate one or more 
principal evaluators and controllers, closely linked to long term memory and comprising 
a very large number of evaluation (appraisal) scales ranged in some order of 
precedence. This system, or possibly federation of systems, I shall call the Principal 
System (s), this leaving open the question whether it is best regarded as singular or 
plural” (Bowlby, 1980, p. 52).  
Though this passage is not a detailed description it does direct research on attachment 
modeling to the exploration of how different constituent parts for an attachment control 
system might be organized and integrated. Updating Bowlby’s conceptualization can 
therefore involve posing questions such as: What kinds of subsystems influence attachment 
behaviour at different ages? How will different subsystems interact? How will the empirical 
finding of continuity in attachment patterns be supported as higher-level subsystems come 
‘on-line’? Lastly, how might new subsystems be constructed? 
One way to attempt to answer these questions is to design and implement running 
simulations of possible attachment models (Petters 2004, 2006, Petters and Waters 2015).  
The field of attachment modeling is in its infancy but there are several examples of 
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computational attachment models which simulate the action of the attachment control 
systems.  Bischof (1975) presented a highly abstract simulation where the simulated infant 
agent and carer agent do not have complex internal states nor possess complex perceptual 
apparatus.  They interact in a very simple 2D virtual environment which possesses no other 
complex objects.  The infant agent’s social motivation is formalized as a cybernetic control 
system that is based upon the operation of attachment and exploration behavior systems.  
The infant agent’s behavior switches between security seeking (moving towards the carer 
agent) or exploration (moving randomly), and the threshold for its behavior switching is 
moderated by a simple measure of familiarity which does not emerge from interaction with 
the environment but is manually switched between settings.   
Petters (2006) presents agent based models (ABMs) which are more complex than 
Bischof’s in several ways.  The infant and carer agents exist in 2D dimensional virtual 
environments in which they can move about and signal to each other with varying 
emotional valence. So infant agents model communications which vary from simulated 
smiling to crying.  Infant and career agents also sense the valence of the signals of other 
agents.  A range of other objects that vary in size and functionality are included in the 
simulated environment.  Toy objects have distinct perceivable attributes about which infant 
agents can learn.  These attributes therefore allow infants agents to discriminate between toy 
objects they have already interacted (‘played’) with and those that remain unfamiliar and so 
novel.  Infant agent can also become familiar with patterns of large objects, allowing them 
to distinguish ‘home’ environments where they have interacted over many simulation cycles 
and a ‘strange situation’ environment with unfamiliar objects and arrangement of objects 
(Ainsworth et al 1978).  Simulations can also include agents which represent unfamiliar 
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adults, such as the friendly ‘stranger’ who interacts with infants during the Strange Situation 
Procedure (Ainsworth et al 1978).   
In the ABMs described in Petters (2006), the internal state of agents is also much more 
complex than the agents in Bischof’s simulation. Infant agents possess behavior systems for 
exploration (of objects); social interaction (with other agents including their carer and a 
‘stranger’); fear (of unfamiliarity over a wariness threshold); physical need (for close 
interaction and food), and attachment anxiety (being far from or out of sight of their carer 
agent) each of which generate and activate respective goals.  Each of these goal generator-
activators includes an opportunistic component, in that if an unfamiliar (therefore attractive) 
toy or social opportunity appears close to the infant this proximity gives rise to high 
temporary activation in the appropriate behaviour system. In addition, goal activation for 
some goals has a drive like component (so any time period without exploration, social 
interaction, or contact with an attachment figure gives rise to a slight incremental increase in 
activation of the goal activation level for these goals).   
As a simulation proceeds goal activation levels for exploration, social interaction, 
reducing wariness and reducing attachment anxiety goals rise and fall.  Several action 
selection mechanisms have been implemented to decide which goal is the one which sets 
external behaviour of movement and signaling.  A relatively simple mechanism 
implemented for action selection is a ‘winner take all’ mechanism where the highest current 
activation controls what goals become active and directs motor and signaling behaviour.  
Computational experiments have been conducted with infant agents with this kind of 
control mechanism, where infant agents can learn how effective and sensitive their carer 
agent is in responding to their signals arising from social interaction and attachment anxiety 
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goals.  These experiments show different patterns of results are produced depending on 
whether infant agents learn about carer agent effectiveness from bids for all kinds of social 
interaction, or from just episodes of response to significant attachment anxiety – a 
theoretically important distinction (McDonald 1992).  A more complex control system has 
also been implemented with dual loci of action selection control – with a winner take all 
action selection mechanism operating alongside a deliberative subsystem which can inhibit 
and redirect behaviour after attempting to reason about what the likely outcome of actions 
directed by the winner-take-all mechanism will be.  The deliberative subsystem of this more 
complex control system includes operators for strategy creation, strategy evaluation and 
selection, and strategy execution.   
Bischof’s, and to a greater extent, Petters’ simulations should be viewed as early 
attempts to explore a large design space of potential attachment control system designs.  A 
key insight presented in this paper is the similarity of these kind of attachment control 
system with contemporary cognitive architectures (Petters 2006, p. 143) suggesting a useful 
reconceptualization of the attachment control system as a ‘cognitive architecture for 
attachment’. Since Bell and Newell (1971) didn’t coin the term ‘cognitive architecture’ until 
1971 it is understandable that this term was not adopted by Bowlby when he originally 
formulated the attachment control system concept in 1969. However, from a contemporary 
vantage point, the match is clear. Newell (1990) defined a cognitive architecture as: “the 
fixed (or slowly varying) structure that forms the framework for the immediate processes of 
cognitive performance and learning.” (Newell, 1990, p. 12). So, Bowlby’s conception of 
the attachment control system is certainly a cognitive architecture in this sense. The 
temporal structure of attachment patterns as long-term control states, and related shorter-
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term states in particular attachment related episodes, can be compared with other kinds of 
affective control states within cognitive architectures (Petters, 2006a; Sloman, 1993). In 
addition, Anderson (2009) conceptualizes cognitive architectures from three perspectives: 
their function; the structures and mechanisms they possess; and the computations they 
perform. Bowlby set out all the three required ingredients for an architectural analysis of 
attachment phenomena, namely: empirically observed attachment behaviors; information 
processing structures and mechanisms; and an evolutionary functional analysis that matches 
these structures and mechanisms with observed behavioral patterns. For example, in the first 
volume of his Attachment Trilogy, Bowlby did not just match behaviors of interest with 
potential information processing structures and mechanisms. He also spent a great deal of 
this first volume concerned with explicating the evolutionary function of attachment 
behaviors like proximity seeking. 
A cognitive architecture does not need to be organized around just four kinds of 
motivation or goal (attachment, fear, sociability and exploration). Instead, the architecture 
should be able to support the pursuit of a very large range of goals, and for a complex 
architecture, pursuing these goals through using various kinds of mechanism or structure. 
Bowlby presented reflexes, fixed action patterns, planning and Internal Working Models 
(IWMs) as mechanisms and structures involved in pursuit of all attachment related goals, 
from infants to adults. Future attachment modeling should update this collection of 
candidate structures and mechanism and systematically explore the architectural design 
space of possible cognitive architectures for attachment.  
Considering how a modern computational account can take attachment theory forward 
we can ask: what are the options a modeler might choose from in designing cognitive 
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architectures? One way to classify different architectures is by the nature of the subsystems 
they possess. The next section presents the planning systems that Bowlby described as part 
of the attachment control system, with some consideration of what shape contemporary up- 
dates might take. The following section presents IWMs as a separate kind of component 
within the attachment control system, which would work alongside the planning system, 
and considers how this construct might be updated. However, how the components are 
arranged in a cognitive architecture is highly influential in determining the architecture’s 
capabilities (Sloman, 1993; Wright, Sloman, & Beaudoin, 1996). For example, Dayan and 
co-workers have formulated a Bayesian cognition framework, inspired by neuroscience and 
information theory, that explains how multiple subsystems (they term ‘controllers’) carry 
out action selection (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Dayan, Niv, Seymour, & Daw, 2006; 
Dayan & Seymour, 2008; Lengyel & Dayan, 2007). Petters and Waters (2010) show how 
the different controllers of this framework are putative explanations for a range of 
attachment phenomena. What is critical about this framework when considering the 
organization of a cognitive architecture for attachment is that a coherent behaviour pattern 
might be driven by more than one controller and the responses of the controllers are 
considered to be mediated by a decision principle based upon uncertainty (Daw et al., 2005; 
Dayan, 2008; Lengyel & Dayan, 2007). Each of the controllers regulated by this decision 
procedure incorporates a measure of its own uncertainty in its likely performance. The least 
uncertain controller is then chosen to direct the next action. This Bayesian decision 
mechanism may account for the distinction between organized and disorganized behavior 
because when experiences are unpredictable no controller has enough certainty in its own 
performance to seize control and direct actions with coherence and consistency.  
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Hierarchical Planning  
Planning involves considering ‘in the mind’ the outcomes that are possible from taking 
sequences of available actions.  Whilst ethology is mainly concerned with how discrete 
actions are taken in response to actual immediate stimuli without much ‘look-ahead’, 
psychoanalysis has a lot to say about how people think reflect in detail on future outcomes.  
However, Bowlby’s treatment of planning within the attachment control system framework 
is based far more strongly on the state search approach of Artificial Intelligence planning 
than psychoanalytic phantasy.  In the first volume of the Attachment and Loss trilogy, 
Bowlby also set out differences between control systems in terms of how the behaviors 
within them are organized. He presented behavioral chaining as an example of a simple 
organizing principle for control systems, and hierarchical planning as much more complex 
and flexible (Bowlby, 1969, p. 76). In this approach, plans are composed of sub-plans, and 
each plan and sub-plan is a set of instructions for action. So, a high-level plan can give a 
main objective and general strategy, where subplans deal more with the details of how to 
implement actions.   
 Bowlby presents a very broad range of planning types. He includes planning 
examples of both explicit human plans and planning carried out by rats and other animals 
(Bowlby, 1969, p. 79-80). Although Bowlby presented contexts in which different kinds of 
plans would be formed, he did not distinguish these planning examples in terms of the sorts 
of representational or computational details needed to implement running simulations. We 
should expect modern computational accounts of planning in the attachment domain to 
situate planning subsystems within an overall computational architecture.  Planning systems 
have been a mainstay of artificial intelligence research from the 1960s to contemporary 
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approaches that range from planning in robot navigation to planning systems which carry 
out complex industrial optimization tasks like scheduling the loading of container-ships 
(Russell & Norvig, 2003). A limitation of traditional AI planning approaches for the 
attachment domain is they involve considering plans as chains of discrete actions from a 
fixed repertoire bringing about transitions between discrete states of the world.  So not 
taking into account the continuous nature of relevant variables in close social interactions.  
Recently, researchers in cognitive science have also implemented systems which are more 
plausible models of planning in natural systems. For example, Cruse (2003) discusses a 
neural network model which can be used to control action, but also when minor changes are 
made the same network can be used to represent the self and environment and carry out 
planning of actions and outcomes of actions before actions are actually taken. This is an 
example of a motor system being re-tasked to become a forward model that might be used 
in planning. Bowlby (1969) certainly considered forward models of this kind for inclusion 
in the attachment control system:  
“the settings to which the servo-units of an anti-aircraft gun are working can be de- 
rived from a radar instrument which is so designed that it tracks the aircraft, and not 
only tracks it but extrapolates from present knowledge of how the aircraft is moving to 
predict the aircraft’s future position. In this way the gun is kept pointing constantly in 
such a way that a shot fired is likely to hit the aircraft. This type of system also is 
replicated in living organisms. There is reason to think that our possession of systems of 
this kind, appropriately linked and integrated, enables us to hit a moving tennis ball, and 
that similarly linked systems enable a falcon to seize a flying bird. Henceforward the 
objective of hitting the ball (or the aircraft) or seizing the bird is termed the set-goal of 
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the system” (Bowlby,1969, p .43)  
Grush (2004) provides a broader review of forward models, describing their wide use in 
diverse theories of human cognition. What all these models have in common is they all 
emulate the outcomes of actions using forward models of those actions without having to 
actually take those actions. Grush provides most illustrations for his emulation account from 
motor control but also outlines other cognitive functions that might be supported by the 
same forward model emulator mechanisms, including reasoning and theory of mind 
phenomena. What Cruse’s network, Grush’s emulators and other contemporary approaches, 
such as predictive processing accounts (Clark 2013), have in common is an intimate 
connection between a planning mechanism (that allows an agent to ‘try out’ actions before 
actually taking them), and representations of the self and environment that act as internal 
working models which support the deliberative planning mechanisms - which is precisely 
what Bowlby set-out in the 1969 first volume of the ‘Attachment and Loss’ trilogy (Bowlby, 
1969), albeit in less detail and without implemented simulations as examples.  
Bowlby presents planning as a bounded cognitive process which is activated within a 
broader control system architecture.  However, hierarchical plans can involve more abstract 
descriptors at higher levels. Such as descriptors related to the self. Therefore, following 
Neubauer’s (2012) analysis, the products and processes involved in hierarchical planning 
can be invoked in self-emergence in a less bounded manner.  So from emulation of actions 
to higher level emergence of self, hierarchical attachment planning provides a potentially 
rich future research direction. 
 
Internal Working Models  
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The concept of ‘Internal Working Models’ (IWMs) as important structures within the 
attachment control system was introduced in the first volume of the ‘Attachment and Loss’ 
trilogy (Bowlby, 1969). Bowlby was very clear about the conceptual heritage of this idea. 
Unlike his ideas on planning which were introduced directly from contemporary sources, 
the IWM concept was an attempt to make scientifically respectable previous ideas from 
psychoanalysis: 
“The environmental and organismic models described here as necessary parts of a 
sophisticated biological control system are, of course, none other than the ‘internal 
worlds’ of traditional psychoanalytic theory seen in a new perspective. As in the 
traditional theory so in the theory advanced, much psychopathology is regarded as being 
due to models that are in greater or less degree inadequate or inaccurate” (Bowlby, 
1969, p. 81)  
In his attempt to draw this concept into scientifically oriented (and therefore evaluable) 
cognitive science, IWMs are described by Bowlby as higher level representational forms 
which integrate and exert control over lower level control systems. Like psychoanalytic 
internal worlds, their principal information processing function in the mature theory is to 
allow predictions to be made about the likely outcomes of taking actions within a given 
environment. 
In the first volume of the trilogy Bowlby emphasizes the requirements for IWMs to be 
updated. He invokes IWMs at early stages in development and later on, when linguistic 
skills and conscious reflection can enable models to become more adequate (Bowlby, 1969, 
p. 84). Bowlby also observes that pathological sequelae of separation and bereavement can 
be understood in terms of out of date models or half revised models which may contain 
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inconsistencies and confusions ((Bowlby, 1969), p. 82). Thus, linking to ideas from his 
three ‘mourning papers’ in the early 1960s where he sets out a three-part process of 
separation anxiety, protest and repression. In the mature version of attachment theory this 
idea is no longer described in the terms of psychoanalysis, and repression is instead 
reframed as ‘defensive exclusion’ (Bowlby, 1980).  
Bowlby linked the construction of plans with the operation of Internal Working Models:  
“Not infrequently, many alternative plans are concocted, their potential 
consequences imagined (on the basis of models of environment and organism) and the 
consequences of each plan appraised. Only after that is any particular plan put into 
operation” (Bowlby, 1969, p. 114)  
As with his presentation of planning, he does not emphasize the representational details 
for IWMs. This is because his audience at that time was researchers and clinicians in 
psychology and psychiatry - not researchers in artificial intelligence, robotics or systems 
engineering. Petters (2016) presents a historical review of the development of the IWM 
concept in Bowlby’s writing and shows the change over time from an analog to symbolic 
conception of IWMs between 1969 and 1982. 
IWMs have been studied in a variety of contemporary simulations.  In the agent based 
models of Petters (2006) the total set of plans and evaluations of expected outcomes can be 
seen as a form of IWM.  A contrasting way to model IWMs is shown in a number of recent 
studies using artificial neural networks (ANNs). These ANNs have been used to simulate, in 
a highly abstract fashion, how attachment representations may change or remain stable over 
development. Put simply, what the ANNs do is recognize patterns in the input information, 
and at later point those patterns can influence future ‘behavior’ of the networks, in the sense 
 ATTACHMENT AND MODELING                                                                                      29 
© 2018, American Psychological Association. This paper is not the copy of record and may not 
exactly replicate the final, authoritative version of the article. Please do not copy or cite without 
authors' permission. The final article will be available, upon publication, via its DOI: 
10.1037/dev0000647 
of the outputs produced in particular contexts. A number of researchers have used Hopfield 
ANNs to simulate prototype formation (Edalat & Mancinelli, 2013; Smith, Stevens, & 
Caldwell, 1999)). Edalat and Mancinelli (2013) present a model that explains early 
attachment stability as arising from strong dynamic systems patterns. They demonstrate in 
Hopfield neural networks that simulations starting in a large number of initial conditions 
end up through multiple iterations in the same final attractor state (so possessing large 
basins of attraction). Demonstrating the interaction of empirical research and modeling, 
Fraley (2007) used an ANN to investigate earlier (Fraley 2002) results from a meta-analysis 
on attachment stability.  The ANN simulation demonstrated how early relationship 
prototypes can be formed and will respond to differing schedules of subsequent experience. 
A key conclusion from these artificial neural network simulations is that simulations can 
demonstrate that early prototypes are not over-written, and so show greater continuity, when 
new relationship experiences are inconsistent. But consistent presentation of new prototypes 
does result in gradual change. 
How might contemporary approaches in cognitive science move this work forward?  
While ANN models provide one possible way of updating Bowlby’s IWM concept, this is 
just one possible direction from diverse options for future research.  The work of Gibson 
(1986) and more recent sensorimotor approaches to action selection provides a contrasting 
way to conceive of IWMs for attachment (reviewed in Petters (2016)). Gibson was 
primarily interested in explaining perception and argued that rather than the function of 
vision being concerned with gaining information about the properties of entities in the 
environment, it was better conceived as providing information about what actions are 
available to individuals - thus giving information about what positive and negative action 
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affordances are available for the perceiver (Sloman, 2011). We can adapt Gibson’s notion of 
action affordances to the attachment domain - what positive and negative attachment 
affordances are available for an infant in a particular context? This work is related to 
existing research looking at how to learn social affordances in human robot interaction 
(Shu, Ryoo and Zhu 2016). Attachment affordances are more abstract than the social 
affordances in this study but share with them being non-representational or ‘representation-
lite’ action-focused conceptualization of IWMs. Viewing IWMs in this manner emphasizes 
that IWMs are not just memory stores but include links from what is perceived to options 
for actions. 
The analysis of Lake, Tomer, Tenebaum, and Gershman (2006) provides an alternative 
view to both the pattern recognition approach using ANNs to stand in for IWMs, and the 
attachment affordances approach. Lake et al. (2006) emphasizes the richness and flexibility 
of human learning and suggest that for human cognition, “model building is a better 
metaphor than learning as pattern recognition” (Lake et al. (2006), p. 38). The basis of this 
view is that human learners operate in a fundamentally different way to today’s ANNs, by 
using rich prior knowledge when engaging in new tasks.  Humans are able to add 
knowledge to existing models because the models operate as general schemes and intuitive 
theories. Models can then be constituted as more than ‘passive’ patterns in networks that 
only produce output as a direct result of new inputs, but structured procedures that generate 
new examples of concepts, which can even possess internal compositional structure. Lake et 
al’s(2006) approach gets us closer to Bowlby’s suggestion that IWMs transmit, store and 
manipulate information and allow the individual to “conduct small scale experiments within 
the head ” (Bowlby, 1969, p. 81). In this contemporary view, an IWM is a world view, with 
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internal ‘moving parts’ of the kind that we can acquire implicitly over time or even 
explicitly wholesale in therapy. 
STABILITY AND LABILITY OVER ONTOGENETIC DEVELOPMENT 
Bowlby didn’t use the terms ‘precocial’ and ‘altricial’ to describe stable or labile control 
systems, but the developmental trade-offs he sketched for these contrasting systems match 
current conceptions in research on altricial and precocial patterns of development in 
contemporary computational cognitive modeling (Chappell & Sloman, 2007). For example, 
Bowlby (1969, p. 46) presents a developmental trade-off whereby ontogenetic lability in a 
control system might result in a longer developmental duration but may also result in this 
control system becoming better adapted and more flexible than a stable fixed alternative. 
Recent work has framed similar ideas in terms of altricial and precocial forms of 
development, within artificial systems which might be used in computational modeling 
(Chappell & Sloman, 2007). It is notable that this recent work has additionally linked 
altricial development (which corresponds to Bowlby’s labile developmental pattern for 
control systems) with the development of higher level more explicit representational forms.  
Representational Change Through Ontogenetic Development  
According to Bowlby, each behavior system in the attachment control system has its 
own ontogenetic development, initially producing reflex actions and later in infancy 
producing fixed action patterns which increase in the complexity of their organization in 
sequences and chains. Behavior systems related to the attachment system continue to 
develop through childhood and in adulthood we can use explicit models and natural 
language to deliberate on the attachment related consequences of our actions. However, 
according to Bowlby earlier developing ‘behavior system’ processes still exist and operate 
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alongside more mature systems. Bowlby compared changes in the kinds of representations 
which infants and children would possess in their attachment control systems with 
representational forms such as sensorimotor, pre-conceptual and symbolic representations 
which were theorized to occur in different Piagetian stages (Bowlby, 1969, p. 153). He also 
speculated that actions which are automatically triggered early in development, such as 
feeding reflexes, might then be organized into causal hierarchies which can then form part 
of plans with set-goals. (Bowlby, 1969, p.160; Petters & Waters, 2010, p. 54-55). This 
appreciation of how representational forms can change early in infancy was matched by an 
acknowledgement of the important role played by language and symbolic forms of 
representation in later stages of development:  
“Thus, whereas during infancy and childhood humans are incapable of structuring 
their behaviour in any way more complex than the simplest of plans, in adolescence and 
adulthood behaviour is habitually structured on the basis of elaborate plan hierarchies. 
This tremendous development on the sophistication of the behavioural organizations 
employed is made possible, of course, by the increasing capacity of the growing human 
child to use symbols, especially language.” (Bowlby, 1969, p. 155)  
Bowlby recognized that natural language is the ultimate and most sophisticated way in 
which an individual can represent themselves within their social environment. This form of 
representation has the benefit that “instead of each one of us having to build his 
environmental and organismic models entirely for himself, he can draw on models built by 
others” (Bowlby, 1969), p. 82)1. A benefit of non-communicative aspect of language is the 
possession of language allows more flexible and imaginative plans  to be created, and 
shared with others, with sharing with others constituting a possible form of therapy. 
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Significantly, Bowlby also recognized that the nature of early representations is 
intimately linked with later patterns of behavior, for example:  
“Man’s capacity to use language and other symbols, his capacities to plan and build 
models, his capacities for long-lasting collaboration with others and for interminable 
strife, these make man what he is. All these processes have their origin during the first 
three years of life, and all, moreover, are from their earliest days enlisted in the 
organization of the attachment behaviour.” (Bowlby, 1969, p. 358)  
 
SYNTHESIS: DEFENSIVE PROCESSES, CONSCIOUSNESS AND THERAPY 
AS META-MANAGEMENT 
As with the conceptual development of IWMs, Bowby’s treatment of defensive 
processes shows a strong inheritance from his prior psychoanalytic views. In particular, he 
transformed ideas on repression into a concept of ‘defensive exclusion’ which conserved 
aspects of the older idea but in a new scientifically respectable format that could be 
integrated with other contemporary cognitive science constructs.   
In the final control systems version of this theory of defensive exclusion, he drew for 
inspiration upon material from the emerging field of cognitive psychology. He explained 
defensive processes in terms of multiple working models and differences in conscious 
access (Bowlby, 1973, p. 238); selective attention (Bowlby, 1980, chapter 4); and explained 
recall, reflection and potential internal conflict in self-image in terms of the distinction 
between episodic and semantic memory (Bowlby, 1980, pp 61-64). 
In his 1973 account, some working models are open to conscious access. Some are 
unconscious but still highly influential, and so act as “a version in different terms, of 
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Freud’s hypothesis of a dynamic unconscious” (Bowlby, 1973, p. 238). Bowlby also 
suggests IWMs can be formed with incompatible information, some of which becomes 
dominant and exerts influence either consciously or unconsciously:  
“In a person suffering from emotional disturbance it is common to find that the model 
that has the greatest influence is one that developed during his early years and is con- 
structed on fairly primitive lines, but that the person himself may be relatively, or 
completely, unaware of; while simultaneously there is operating in him a second, and 
perhaps radically incompatible, model, that developed later, that is much more 
sophisticated, that the person is more nearly aware of and that he may mistakenly 
supposed to be dominant.” (Bowlby, 1973, p. 238).  
Bowlby also linked the operation of information processing with conscious awareness:  
“Reflection suggests that many of the mental processes of which we are most keenly 
conscious are processes concerned with the building of models, with revising or 
extending them, checking them for internal consistency, or drawing on them for making a 
novel plan to reach a set-goal. Although it is certainly not necessary for all such 
processes always to be conscious, it is probably necessary that some should be so 
sometimes. In particular, it seems likely that revising, extending and checking of models 
are ill done or done not at all unless a model is subjected from time to time to whatever 
special benefits accrue from becoming conscious” (Bowlby, 1969, p. 82).  
These quotes show that Bowlby’s high-level framework can provide inspiration for 
contemporary computational models of defensive exclusion.  However, although the 
problem has been analysed no fully implemented simulations of defensive processes have 
yet been produced.  Work towards simulations of defensive exclusion includes Petters and 
 ATTACHMENT AND MODELING                                                                                      35 
© 2018, American Psychological Association. This paper is not the copy of record and may not 
exactly replicate the final, authoritative version of the article. Please do not copy or cite without 
authors' permission. The final article will be available, upon publication, via its DOI: 
10.1037/dev0000647 
Coyne-Umfreville (2017) and Petters and Beaudoin (2017) discussing how the differences 
in self-knowledge demonstrated in dismissing and preoccupied behavior patterns in the 
Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) might be modelled using contrasting frequency and 
decay memory recall functions that control what memories become accessible during the 
AAI.   
Part of the challenge in simulating defensive processes is the link to consciousness.  
When considering how a modern computational approach can take these ideas forward it is 
worth noting Sloman’s observation that current research on consciousness within cognitive 
science is “riddled with confusion and muddle” (Sloman 2011, p. 2). He suggests that this 
term is better replaced with precisely defined labels for special cases. For example, notions 
of accessibility or inaccessibility of self-knowledge might be captured in theories of 
consciousness which invoke something like a reflective or second-order or meta-
management processing layer in a cognitive architecture (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Minsky, 
2006; Sloman & Chrisley, 2003). In this view, considering how an architecture might 
simulate having thoughts about thoughts is a way to investigate some kinds of self-
reflection or meta-management which are of interest to attachment researchers. Of particular 
pertinence to computational modeling, Bowlby describes how much of our habitual 
processing is automatic and portrays the kinds of reflective meta-processing on mental life 
which occurs in therapy (at least when therapy is successful) in explicitly computational 
terms:  
“The psychological state may then be likened to that of a computer that, once 
programmed, produces its results automatically when activated. Provided the programme 
is the one required, all is well. [When] representational models and programmes are well 
 ATTACHMENT AND MODELING                                                                                      36 
© 2018, American Psychological Association. This paper is not the copy of record and may not 
exactly replicate the final, authoritative version of the article. Please do not copy or cite without 
authors' permission. The final article will be available, upon publication, via its DOI: 
10.1037/dev0000647 
adapted, the fact that they are drawn on automatically and without awareness is a great 
advantage. When however, they are not well adapted, for whatever reason, the disadvan- 
tages of the arrangement become serious. 
For the task is of changing an over-learned programme of action and/or of appraisal 
is enormously exacerbated when rules long implemented by the evaluative system forbid 
its being reviewed. [...] A psychological state of this kind in which a ban on reviewing 
models and action systems is effected outside awareness is one encountered frequently 
during psychotherapy. It indicates the existence of another stage of processing at which 
defensive exclusion can also take place, different to the stage at which perceptual defence 
takes place. (Bowlby, 1980, p. 55-56)  
In this passage, what Bowlby is referring to when he discusses therapy as reviewing 
models are meta-processes such as self-reflection and meta-management (Sloman, 2011). 
Research focusing on meta-management and self-reflective capabilities operating alongside 
other action selection mechanisms in complex scenarios such as those found in the 
attachment domain remains an under-explored area of cognitive systems research (Vernon, 
2014, p. 12). Therefore, there is scope for progress in this area, and research can take 
inspiration from both the requirements set out by Bowlby’s account and contemporary 
modeling approaches. 
Cognitive modeling research on memory processes, such as memory accessibility in 
language use, is much more developed than research on self-reflection and meta-
management (Lewis & Vasishth, 2005). However, Donald (2001) provides a analysis that 
shows the two approaches are related.  This is because the differential accessibility of 
certain kinds of thoughts and memories, the expression of which is observed in attachment 
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discourse like the AAI, may be investigated by looking at biases and selectivity in memory 
retrievals. As Hesse (2008) notes, the relatively fast paced AAI protocol has the potential to 
“surprise the unconscious”.  Particular discourse patterns which reveal a particular kind of 
internal ‘state of mind’ occur in part because of what is brought to mind from memory and 
what is not. Both Petters and Coyne-Umfreville (2017) and Petters and Beaudoin (2017) 
follow this line of exploration in their analysis of how modeling differential memory 
retrieval is a way to model defensive processes. Therefore, the current state-of-the-art in 
attachment modeling does not attempt to explain the first-person phenomenology of 
conscious self-awareness in the attachment domain. But existing approaches can attempt to 
explain the routes by which, for some, memories can form part of integrated and coherent 
narratives, whilst for others, certain memories do not reach self-awareness.  So explaining 
defensive processes in terms of ineffective access consciousness rather than in terms of 
phenomenal consciousness (Donald 2001). 
MODELS THAT BRIDGE SOCIAL AND NEUROSCIENCE LEVELS 
Attachment theory investigates a huge range of phenomena - from the secure base 
behavior of one-year old infants in a public park (Anderson, 1972) to the linguistic 
narratives adults present about their own childhood experiences (Hesse, 2008). So, 
attachment modeling also needs to capture meaning-making and attachment discourse, with 
models which support language and declarative memory. Whilst some perceptual, motor 
and affective phenomena of interest might be simulated at a low neuroscience abstraction 
level, this paper argues taking a turn to neuroscience by modeling just at this level is not the 
way forward on its own. Ballard (2015) sets out a solution to the requirement for attachment 
models to bridge different levels of analysis. As Ballard notes, understanding the interaction 
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of high level functions like goal based processing and intentional behavior, and low-level 
functions such as neural action will likely be more demanding and may even be intractable 
if the system is only analyzed at lower levels of abstraction. Such as looking at the behavior 
of individual neurons or low level neural networks. He argues that since the brain has a 
hierarchical structure comparable to the hierarchical organizing principle of computation, 
layered structures in the brain can be compared with computational abstraction hierarchies.  
When models are posited at high abstraction levels, lower level details are initially 
suppressed but not ultimately ignored. On the contrary, as Ballard notes: “by telescoping 
through different levels, we can parcellate the brain’s enormous complexity into 
manageable levels”. ((Ballard, 2015), p. 18). We can therefore integrate over abstraction 
levels for domains that require this, like attachment modeling. Having multi-level models 
can then aid evaluation by bringing to bear stronger empirical constraints because different 
abstraction levels will all constrain the model.   
A benefit of this approach is models with intermediate psychological level constructs 
can link results from social psychology research on attachment with neuroscience results.  
This has not tended to occur.  For example, whilst an early paper by Hazan and Shaver 
(1994) launched a social psychology approach in attachment research and this paper did 
invoke simple control systems diagrams, Crowell, Fraley and Roisman (2016) note that on 
the whole, the study of adult attachment processes has not tended to emphasize the 
normative development aspects of the attachment system.  Hence the elucidation of the 
attachment control system in this work has not been central.  Rather, according to Crowell, 
Fraley and Roisman, a social psychology approach in attachment research has mainly 
focused on individual differences in behavior and cognitions such as expectations.  In 
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addition, from the neuroscience perspective, Coan (2016, p 243) argues that it is important 
to attempt to bridge currently disparate sub-fields - bringing together research on attachment 
as a neural construct and individual difference research on attachment.  This paper therefore 
makes a contribution by showing how to integrate lower and higher level approaches 
through combining both within broad architectural architectural ‘control system’ models. 
CONCLUSION 
Attachment theory originated from theories set out by Freud, and other psychoanalysts. 
However, Bowlby ultimately formed a clear distinction between attachment theory and 
psychoanalytic theory. He did this by explaining the richness, broad scope and complexity 
of behavioral phenomena which interest psychoanalysts in information processing terms 
which are congruent with contemporary cognitive science constructs. 
Updating attachment theory by engaging in attachment modeling - that is, using 
computers to simulate attachment phenomena - has all the benefits that computational 
modeling is generally found to have in the mostly cognitive psychology research fields in 
which it is predominantly undertaken (Dawson 2004). A lot of clear thinking has to go into 
creating running simulations.  For theories of psychological phenomena to be run on a 
computer requires in those theories precision and explicitness in description and a process 
of formalization which highlights possible logical flaws, inconsistencies, lacunae, hidden 
assumptions or unexpected complexities about the processes being modelled.  In addition to 
this welcome rigor, the overall process promotes serendipitous discoveries because running 
simulation can produce unforeseen behaviour (Petters, 2004, 2006a; Petters & Waters, 
2015). 
A number of specific benefits accrue from reviewing and updating the information 
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processing foundations of attachment theory. The first is that attachment theory, with its 
contemporary multifaceted and diverse nature, can be better integrated as a research field. 
The potential integrative benefits of attachment modeling are underscored by looking at 
how models can bring together elements from the great diversity of approaches in 
contemporary attachment theory. A single model can include interacting agents that 
represent infants, caregivers and strangers, so enabling the Strange Situation Procedure to 
be simulated (Petters & Waters, 2015). The care-giver software agents that are used to 
model Strange Situation studies can also be used in simulations of the Adult Attachment 
Interview (Petters & Beaudoin, 2017; Petters & Coyne-Umfreville, 2017).  Having such 
diverse types of empirical data, from the many empirical attachment measures now used as 
well as the many perspectives that attachment research now follows, allow attachment 
model evaluation and validation by constraining models to simulate such a broad 
specification of requirements (Petters, 2004, 2006a). 
Fonagy suggests attachment theory can seem ‘method-bound’ because of the strong 
focus on a set of validated measures:  
[Attachment theory’s] “scope was determined less by what fell within the domain 
defined by relationship phenomena involving a caretaking-dependent dyad and more by 
the range of groups and behaviors to which the preferred mode of observation, the 
strange situation, the adult attachment interview, and so forth, could be productively 
applied.” (Fonagy, 1999, pp. 472-473). 
While Fonagy’s remedy for the method-bound nature of attachment theory is to suggest 
that attachment theory researchers engage with the clinical discoveries of psychoanalysts, 
attachment modeling can provide a different route out of what Fonagy perceives is a 
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method-bound domain. Attachment models can produce new predictions for existing 
measures and can simulate behavior in contexts not covered by current measures or 
observations. So while this paper has presented a diverse range of contemporary models as 
updates for elements of Bowlby’s framework, future work can be even broader in scope and 
ambition. 
To sum up, while contemporary attachment theory is diverse and multifaceted with 
many varied perspectives, most of these perspectives involve collecting new kinds of 
empirical data not new underlying information processing explanations for attachment 
theory. Computational modeling that ‘telescopes’ across abstraction levels (Ballard, 2015) 
can help update Bowlby’s conception of the attachment control system. While modeling can 
contribute to attachment theory, the benefit is two-way. There is significant value in the 
rich, deep, broad and complex modeling scenarios that the attachment domain provides for 
computational modelers. 
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Footnotes 
1 This is a 1969 description which presages Dennett’s 1995 description of Gregorian 
Minds. The similarity may not be coincidental. Dennett termed ‘Gregorian Minds’ after 
Richard Gregory. The author of this paper met Richard Gregory and in a subsequent 
email exchange, in February 2010, Richard Gregory wrote: “ I spent exactly one whole 
day with John Bowlby when he came to Bristol to visit me and we had a really great 
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day. For most of the time we talked about what we were doing in the Brain and 
Perception laboratory in the Medical School but we did also talk about his work and I 
have spent quite a lot of time reading his papers and commenting on them. He did 
indeed have very wide interests and did think in terms of cybernetics and especially 
interacting machines. I must say I liked him very much indeed, and he certainly had a 
sharp and imaginative mind.” 
